Text or WhatsApp Richard at (808) 600-9260
Lion crestHealthcareInvestmentBanking.com

The Healthcare Capital Stack: Who Funds What, at What Cost and With What Control

Senior lenders fund the cheapest layer and take covenants, not board seats. Mezzanine funds, family offices and selling owners fund the subordinated middle and charge a higher coupon plus a kicker. Preferred investors buy a minority stake and take a liquidation preference, a board seat and vetoes. Majority buyers pay the purchase multiple and take control. For physician practices, Sikich's Q3 2026 update puts that multiple at 5x to 13x EBITDA, depending on size. Rollover equity sits beside the buyer's equity and has the least say of any layer. The cheapest dollar is the one that gives up the least of your future growth. Price every layer against your growth case before you sell equity.

Market data as of November 20, 2026. Every figure names its source, population and date.

The 6 layers: priority, cost and control

The healthcare capital stack, from cheapest and safest to costliest and riskiest
Senior secured debt (bank, SBA, unitranche)First claim on assets and cash flow; covenants; lowest cost; no ownershipAsset-based and receivables lendingBorrowing base tied to accounts receivable or equipment; works for revenue-cycle-heavy businessesSubordinated or mezzanine debtBehind senior debt; higher coupon, often warrants; limited control rightsPreferred equityPriority on distributions and exit proceeds; negotiated board and consent rightsCommon equity (owners, physicians, sponsors, family offices)Last in line, all of the upside; carries control through the boardRollover and management equitySellers and physicians who stay invested; value depends on the second sale

Order reflects typical priority in a default or sale; actual terms depend on the documents.

Text version
  1. Senior secured debt (bank, SBA, unitranche): First claim on assets and cash flow; covenants; lowest cost; no ownership
  2. Asset-based and receivables lending: Borrowing base tied to accounts receivable or equipment; works for revenue-cycle-heavy businesses
  3. Subordinated or mezzanine debt: Behind senior debt; higher coupon, often warrants; limited control rights
  4. Preferred equity: Priority on distributions and exit proceeds; negotiated board and consent rights
  5. Common equity (owners, physicians, sponsors, family offices): Last in line, all of the upside; carries control through the board
  6. Rollover and management equity: Sellers and physicians who stay invested; value depends on the second sale

HealthcareInvestmentBanking.com

The chart and the table use the same six layers in the same order. Layers run from first paid to last paid. Layer 3 has two subtypes: 3a, mezzanine, and 3b, seller notes. Both are subordinated debt. Layers 5 and 6 share the residual claim. In most deals rollover is the same class as sponsor common and is paid at the same time. It is listed last because its holder has the least control. It is not paid later. When rollover goes into a junior holding-company class, it does rank behind sponsor common. Loan documents, intercreditor agreements and subordination agreements set the actual order in each deal.

# Layer Who provides it How it is priced Control given up Use it when
1 Senior secured debt: bank term loans, SBA loans, unitranche Banks, SBA lenders, direct lenders, credit funds Spread over a floating base rate, plus fees. SBA loans add guarantee fees. Unitranche prices above bank debt because one loan carries both senior and junior risk Covenants, liens and personal guarantees on smaller loans. Unitranche lenders often require consent before add-on acquisitions EBITDA is stable and payer mix is diversified
2 Asset-based lending (ABL) Asset-based lenders, some banks Rate on the drawn balance. Availability is sized to eligible receivables Borrowing-base reporting, field exams, cash dominion on default Receivables are clean and the business needs working capital
3a Subordinated debt: mezzanine Mezzanine funds, family offices Cash coupon, sometimes PIK, plus warrants or exit participation Small dilution and consent rights The owner wants to fund a growth gap without selling control
3b Subordinated debt: seller note The selling owner Negotiated coupon and term Little. The seller becomes a creditor Buyer and seller disagree on value, or the buyer is short of funding at close
4 Preferred or minority equity Family offices, growth funds, physician investors Liquidation preference, preferred return, conversion terms, sometimes participation Board seat, vetoes on a sale, new debt and the budget The owner wants growth capital without a change of control
5 Majority common equity PE platforms, strategics, health systems Purchase multiple Board, exit timing, management The goal is liquidity and scale
6 Rollover equity The selling owner, reinvesting part of the proceeds The buyer's purchase multiple A minority position in the buyer's entity with limited governance In a majority sale, the owner wants a stake in the next exit

Family offices are not a separate layer. They appear as private lenders, mezzanine providers and minority investors in layers 1, 3a and 4.

Three rankings, not one

Repayment priority, cost and governance do not move together. Cost tends to rise as priority falls, but collateral, maturity, growth and equity terms all bend that line.

Layer Repayment priority Economic cost to the owner Governance given up
1. Senior secured First, secured on all assets Lowest cash cost per dollar. Unitranche prices above bank debt Covenants and guarantees
2. ABL First on receivables, as set by the intercreditor agreement Low, but the borrowing base caps capacity Reporting and collateral control
3a. Mezzanine Behind senior, under a subordination agreement Higher coupon plus a kicker Consent rights, small dilution
3b. Seller note Behind senior and often behind other buyer lenders Deferred price at a negotiated coupon Little
4. Preferred equity Ahead of common at exit Preference, preferred return and dilution. Can cost more than mezzanine when the business grows fast Board seat and vetoes
5. Majority common Residual Highest required return. The owner sells at today's multiple Control of the board and the exit
6. Rollover Residual, equal with sponsor common in most deals, junior if rolled into a subordinated class Illiquid and exposed to the buyer's leverage Very little

How each layer's price is built

Rate quotes move with base rates and credit, so compare structures rather than headline coupons. Get term sheets from at least three types of lender and put every cost on the same all-in basis.

Layer Price components to model What moves the price Terms to push on
1. Senior secured Spread over base rate, upfront fee, unused fee, prepayment terms Leverage multiple, payer mix, quality of EBITDA Covenant headroom, add-on basket, guarantee release
2. ABL Rate on drawn balance, advance rate, field exam and audit fees Receivables aging, denial rates, payer concentration Eligibility definitions, reserves, cash dominion trigger
3a. Mezzanine Cash coupon, PIK interest, warrant percentage, prepayment premium Total leverage, growth case, exit timing Warrant cap, PIK toggle, call protection that steps down
3b. Seller note Coupon, term, amortization The buyer's senior debt and the subordination terms Parent guarantee, cross-default, cap on payment blockage
4. Preferred Preferred return (cash or accrued), preference multiple, participation, conversion price Valuation, growth, the investor's downside protection Non-participating, 1x preference, simple rather than compounding return
5. Majority common Purchase multiple Size, segment, platform or add-on status Earnout terms, rollover percentage, escrow
6. Rollover The buyer's multiple at entry The buyer's leverage and hold period Same class as sponsor, tag-along, information rights

What equity costs: 5x to 13x EBITDA, largely set by size

Equity is priced through the purchase multiple. In BuckheadFMV's dataset, scale is the largest single driver of value. Sikich's physician practice bands show the same step-up:

EBITDA band (physician practices, Sikich Q3 2026) Indicative EV/EBITDA Starting pre-tax EBITDA yield to buyer (our arithmetic)
Under $1 million 5x to 7x 14.3% to 20.0%
$1 million to $3 million 7x to 9x 11.1% to 14.3%
$3 million to $5 million 9x to 11x 9.1% to 11.1%
Above $5 million 11x to 13x 7.7% to 9.1%

The yield column is 1 divided by the multiple. It is the buyer's return on day one, before growth, leverage or synergies. An owner who sells at 6x is selling equity at a 16.7% starting yield. Moving up one band before a sale often adds more value than any term negotiated at the table. Sikich puts the premium for platforms over add-on practices at four to eight turns.

Four datasets, four populations

Each row below measures a different set of deals. Read each row on its own. Do not compare across rows.

Source and population Period Small end Large end Median
BuckheadFMV: 187 U.S. healthcare services control transactions with disclosed prices. EBITDA medians use the 68 deals with positive EBITDA Announced Jan 2023 to Oct 2026 Deals under $10M: 2.8x EBITDA, 0.27x revenue Deals over $200M: 11.2x EBITDA, 1.34x revenue 9.6x EBITDA, 0.88x revenue (10.1x and 0.98x without distressed sales)
Axia Growth: closed healthcare-sector small-business sales over $500K, about 290 deals summed across its published bands (our sum, inexact if bands overlap or some bands are unpublished) Data as of Oct 28, 2026 Under $500K SDE: 3.4x SDE (n=182) $10M+ EBITDA: 12.9x EBITDA (n=17) Not reported
PitchBook data reported by Sikich: all U.S. healthcare M&A 2024, 2025, 2026 year to date at Sikich's Q3 2026 update Not reported Not reported 14.5x (2024), 13x (2025), 11.6x (2026 YTD) EV/EBITDA. Trailing 12 months 12.7x. EV/revenue 2.4x
Sikich: PE-backed healthcare services buyouts 2024 and 2025 Not reported Not reported 13.5x (2024), 13.6x (2025) EBITDA. Implied target EBITDA about $33M in 2025

How to read the small end. BuckheadFMV sets its size bands by deal value, not by EBITDA. Its under-$10 million cell is dominated by hospital purchases of individual primary care practices, mostly in West Virginia. Those deals price at 0.05x to 0.15x revenue, close to asset value. Small private deals also report EBITDA less often, so BuckheadFMV's EBITDA medians lean toward larger transactions. Its 2.8x EBITDA figure for deals under $10 million comes from the few small deals among the 68 with positive EBITDA, so treat it as a thin sample skewed toward hospital buyers. Its annual medians were 11.4x (2023), 9.7x (2024), 6.5x (2025) and 9.1x (2026 through October). BuckheadFMV attributes the 2025 dip to a smaller, more mid-market mix of deals, not a broad repricing. Axia's small-deal figures are multiples of seller's discretionary earnings (SDE). SDE adds back owner compensation, so an SDE multiple runs lower than an EBITDA multiple on the same business. BuckheadFMV and Axia also define their deal populations differently, so do not read their multiples as directly comparable.

Segment multiples

Segment Sikich indicative EV/EBITDA, Q3 2026 BuckheadFMV median, control deals Jan 2023 to Oct 2026 Sikich: 2026 vs. 2025
ASCs Single-specialty 5x to 8x, multispecialty 6x to 10x, regional operators 11x to 17x 12.4x EBITDA, 1.24x revenue Up
Dental (DSOs) Platforms 9x to 11x, add-ons 5x to 8x, practices 5x to 9x Not reported Flat
Home health and hospice Enhabit take-private at 10.2x, as cited by Sikich Q3 2026. Small agencies typically mid-single digits Not reported Down
Urgent care 3x to 7x under $10M revenue, 6x to 11x at $10M to $50M Not reported Not reported
Hospitals About 10x long-run average, per Sikich Q3 2026. Public comps cited by Sikich, as of June 30, 2026: HCA 8.5x, Community Health 7.5x, Ardent 6.1x 9.5x EBITDA, 0.41x revenue Flat
Outsourced services Not reported 11.6x EBITDA, 2.8x revenue Not reported

Reconciling the ASC row. Sikich reports a 2025 median ASC multiple of 7.9x, the highest in at least eight years. That figure falls inside its single-specialty and multispecialty bands. BuckheadFMV's 12.4x falls in Sikich's regional-operator band, which fits a dataset that leans toward larger deals with disclosed EBITDA. A single center should benchmark against the first figure and a multi-site operator against the second. For more segment detail, see healthcare valuation multiples.

Senior debt: 5.2x entry leverage on sponsor buyouts

Sikich reports entry leverage of 5.2x EBITDA on PE-backed healthcare services buyouts, in the same passage as its 13.6x median purchase multiple for 2025. If both figures describe the same deals and the same EBITDA, debt funded about 5.2 ÷ 13.6 = 38% of enterprise value (our arithmetic). Sponsor equity and rollover funded about 62%. Equity still carries most of the price, even in sponsor deals.

For smaller credits, the SBA 7(a) program is the SBA's main small business loan program. The program sets a loan size limit that can change, so confirm the current rule with your lender. Its loans fit practice acquisitions, buy-ins and small recaps, not platform deals.

The cash flow behind this debt has room to grow. Per the CMS National Health Expenditure fact sheet, spending on physician and clinical services grew 8.1% to $1,109.7 billion in 2024. CMS projects it will grow 5.5% a year on average from 2025 to 2034. Lenders underwrite the practice, not the sector, but that growth is part of why private credit keeps competing for healthcare services loans.

Margin sets how much debt a business can carry. NYU Stern's January 2026 data (Damodaran) on U.S. public companies shows how far apart healthcare subsectors sit.

U.S. public subsector (Damodaran, Jan 2026) Firms EBITDA margin EV/Sales
Healthcare Support Services 104 3.21% 0.46x
Hospitals/Healthcare Facilities 31 14.05% 1.69x
Healthcare Information and Technology 115 17.12% 5.31x

EV/Sales figures come from Damodaran's EV to sales file, January 2026.

Worked example (hypothetical, our arithmetic). Three companies each have $50 million of revenue. Each earns its subsector's public-company EBITDA margin and borrows 3.0x EBITDA in senior debt. The 3.0x is an assumption chosen for comparison. It is not a market quote.

Company EBITDA Senior debt at 3.0x
Staffing or billing company at 3.21% $1.6 million $4.8 million
Facility operator at 14.05% $7.0 million $21.1 million
Healthtech company at 17.12% $8.6 million $25.7 million

On the same revenue, the healthtech company can borrow more than five times what the staffing company can. The thin-margin services business runs out of senior debt early and moves up the stack sooner. Run your own numbers in the debt capacity calculator and compare lender types in healthcare debt financing.

Family offices: three layers, one decision

Family offices lend directly, write mezzanine and buy minority preferred stakes. The deals that reach them usually fall outside a bank's credit box: a concentrated payer mix, a founder-dependent practice, a de novo site, or a loan too small for a direct lending fund. Terms are written around the specific risk, and a lender may ask for a board observer seat.

When the bank says no, the real comparison is family office debt against selling preferred equity, not against bank debt. A higher-coupon loan that leaves the cap table untouched can cost less than a preferred round if the business grows. The next section shows where that holds and where it breaks.

Do two checks before the first meeting. First, search SEC EDGAR for Form D notices filed by healthcare companies in your specialty. They show which peers have raised private capital and how much. Second, if anyone offers to introduce you to investors for a fee, look up that firm and banker on FINRA BrokerCheck. How family offices invest in healthcare covers what these investors underwrite.

Mezzanine vs. preferred equity: growth decides

A mezzanine lender adds a kicker, such as warrants or exit participation, on top of the coupon. A preferred investor adds a liquidation preference. Preferred terms vary on participation, accrued return, seniority and conversion, and each one changes the economics. The example below tests two common structures. Its outputs are stylized results from the stated assumptions. They are not standard deal outcomes.

Worked example (hypothetical, our arithmetic). A practice with $3 million of EBITDA is valued at 9x, or $27 million. It needs $5 million for growth.

Assumptions. Four-year hold, no interim distributions, pre-tax, no fees. Exit EV is the same under every option. Under B, the company pays the $2.4 million of interest from operating cash flow. Under A1 and A2, that $2.4 million stays in the business as cash, earns nothing and passes to equity at exit dollar for dollar. Exit equity is therefore EV plus $2.4 million under A, and EV minus the $5 million principal under B. All figures are in $ millions.

Exit case Exit EV Equity under A A1 investor take A1 owner A2 investor take A2 owner Equity under B B warrants (2%) B owner
No growth, $3M EBITDA at 9x 27.0 29.4 6.80 (preference) 22.6 8.81 20.6 22.0 0.44 21.6
$5M EBITDA at 10x 50.0 52.4 8.19 (converts) 44.2 12.41 40.0 45.0 0.90 44.1
$7M EBITDA at 10x 70.0 72.4 11.31 (converts) 61.1 15.53 56.9 65.0 1.30 63.7

How to read it. With no growth, non-participating preferred beats mezzanine by $1.0 million. At $5 million of EBITDA the two are effectively even. At $7 million, mezzanine beats A1 by $2.6 million. Participating preferred trails mezzanine in all three cases, by $1.0 million, $4.1 million and $6.8 million.

Sensitivity: drop the retained-cash credit. A1's lead in the flat case comes entirely from the $2.4 million of retained cash. Taxes, working capital or distributions would shrink it. If none of that cash reaches exit equity, A1 equity equals exit EV (our arithmetic, all other assumptions unchanged):

Exit case A1 owner, no retained cash B owner Mezzanine advantage
No growth 20.2 (investor takes the 6.80 preference) 21.6 1.4
$5M EBITDA at 10x 42.2 44.1 1.9
$7M EBITDA at 10x 59.1 63.7 4.6

Fast EBITDA growth favors debt with a small kicker over equity sold at today's price. Flat growth narrows the gap. Clean non-participating preferred wins only when the cash it saves stays in the business. The model also leaves out taxes, transaction costs, debt changes and distributions, and any of these could change the result for a real deal. Interest deductibility alone would tilt the comparison further toward mezzanine. Settle preference terms before you compare the two offers.

Seller notes: deferred price, last among lenders

A seller note is deferred purchase price. It is layer 3b. It typically ranks behind the senior lender under a subordination agreement and often behind the buyer's other lenders as well, so price it as subordinated credit. Ask for three protections: a guarantee from the buyer's parent, a cross-default to the senior facility and acceleration on any payment default. If the senior lender insists on full subordination, negotiate a cap on how long it can block your payments.

Worked example: one $4 million EBITDA practice, three stacks

Hypothetical, our arithmetic. A practice with $4 million of EBITDA is valued at 10x, an enterprise value of $40 million. It has no existing debt, and the deal is cash-free and debt-free. All cash figures are gross, before fees and taxes. In the minority recap, the investor buys existing shares from the owner. In the dividend recap, all loan proceeds go to the owner.

Structure Cash to owner at close Owner keeps New debt and where it sits Control
Majority sale with 20% rollover $32 million (80% of $40M) $8 million rolled into the buyer's equity Acquisition debt at the buyer's platform or holding company. At Sikich's 5.2x entry leverage, about $20.8 million (5.2 × $4M) The buyer controls the board and the exit
Minority recap, 30% preferred, no discount $12 million (30% of $40M) 70% None The owner controls. The investor holds vetoes and a preference
Minority recap, 30% preferred, 20% minority discount (assumed) $9.6 million (30% × $40M × 0.8) 70% None Same as above
Dividend recap, 2.5x senior debt $10 million (2.5 × $4M) 100% $10 million on the practice, 2.5x EBITDA The owner controls. The lender sets covenants

The majority sale pays $22 million more today than the dividend recap ($32 million less $10 million), but the owner hands over the exit. The rolled $8 million ranks behind whatever debt the buyer places in its structure, about $20.8 million in this illustration. It is a second bet on the buyer's leverage and timing. The minority recap looks strongest only if the investor pays the full control multiple. Apply an assumed 20% minority discount and its cash falls below the dividend recap's, while the owner still gives up 30% of the equity and accepts vetoes. Ask every minority bidder whether its price includes a discount before you compare offers. Work through the physician rollover equity checklist and healthcare recapitalization before you choose.

Which layer fits your situation

Your situation Start with Then consider Avoid
Stable EBITDA, diversified payers, modest capital need Layer 1 bank or SBA debt Layer 2 ABL for working capital Selling equity to fund what debt can cover
Strong receivables, lumpy cash flow Layer 2 ABL Layer 1 term debt for capex Fixed amortization the cash cycle cannot meet
High-confidence growth plan, bank capacity used up Layer 3a mezzanine or family office debt A small layer 4 preferred round Participating preferred
Uncertain growth, owner wants a partner and capital Layer 4 non-participating preferred Layer 3a for part of the need Compounding returns and preferences above 1x
Owner wants liquidity and a second bite Layer 5 majority sale with layer 6 rollover Layer 3b seller note to bridge a valuation gap Rolling into a junior class without tag-along rights
Thin-margin services business Layer 2 ABL Layer 4 or 5 equity Sizing debt off revenue instead of EBITDA

Who is writing checks in 2026

Signal Data, source and date What it means for the stack
Outpatient deal flow 148 PE deals involving outpatient care providers in 2025, 119 of them add-ons, or 80% (our arithmetic). PESP data via Becker's ASC Review Most practice capital arrives as add-on equity from existing platforms
Top outpatient subsectors Dermatology 24, eye care 22, oncology 9 deals in 2025. PESP data via Becker's ASC Review Platform buyers concentrate in a few specialties
Drug-intensive specialties Bain says scale platforms can support drug-cost management in specialties such as neurology and urology. Bain & Company, Global Healthcare PE Report 2026 Platform buyers in these fields pay for purchasing scale
Hospital M&A volume 22, 18 and 16 hospital and health system deals announced in Q1, Q2 and Q3 2026, for 56 through Q3. All of 2025 had 46, the lowest annual count since tracking began in 2011. Kaufman Hall data via Becker's Hospital Review Health systems are active buyers again. Q3 2026 matched Q3 2025
Hospital deal size, Q3 2026 $8.2B of transacted revenue. Average seller revenue about $586M. Two megamergers, which Kaufman Hall defines as deals where the smaller party has more than $1B of annual revenue. Kaufman Hall, Oct 13, 2026 Large systems dominate. Not-for-profits made up most of the acquirers
Hospital finances Operating margin of 2.5% including allocations, year to date through August 2026. Nearly 43% of hospitals were operating at a loss. Year to date versus 2025, non-labor expense per adjusted discharge rose 6%, supply expense 5% and drug expense 6%. Kaufman Hall, Oct 13, 2026 Thin margins cap how much debt systems can carry. Divestitures were nearly one-third of Q3 2026 deals

Before the first call: what each layer will underwrite

Each provider underwrites a different risk, so each asks for a different file. Owners who have the right package ready before the first call get comparable term sheets faster. Build the file for each layer you plan to approach.

Layer What the provider tests Have ready before you call Where deals usually slow down
1. Senior secured Whether EBITDA can service the debt with room to spare Three years of financials, trailing 12 months of monthly results, supported EBITDA add-backs, payer mix by share of collections, capex plan Add-backs the lender rejects, which shrinks the EBITDA it will lend against
2. ABL Whether receivables will turn into cash on schedule Receivables aging by payer, denial and write-off history, cash posting reconciliation Field exam findings that cut eligible receivables
3a. Mezzanine or family office debt Whether the coupon is covered even if growth slips Use of proceeds, a base case and a flat case, total leverage after the raise A flat case that cannot carry the cash interest
3b. Seller note Whether the buyer's senior lender will let the note be paid The buyer's senior debt terms and the draft subordination agreement Payment blockage and standstill terms negotiated late
4. Preferred or minority equity What protects the investor's downside Cap table, budget, the vetoes you will and will not accept, your target terms (non-participating, 1x, simple return) Preference and participation fights after price is agreed
5. Majority common Quality of earnings and how the business performs without the founder Quality of earnings report, provider compensation plans, payer contracts, key staff retention plan Diligence findings that reopen price or add an earnout
6. Rollover What the rolled stake sits behind The buyer's planned leverage, the class you will hold, tag-along and information rights Holding-company documents seen only days before closing

Run the downside case first. In the mezzanine example, $2.4 million of interest over four years is $0.6 million a year against $3 million of EBITDA, or 20% of EBITDA. If EBITDA stays flat, operating cash flow has to cover that every year. In the three-stack example, the dividend recap puts $10 million of debt on the practice at 2.5x. A majority buyer at 5.2x would place about $20.8 million at the platform or holding company, ahead of the owner's $8 million rollover. Show both numbers to every provider and ask how its terms behave if EBITDA does not grow.

High-risk area: map the regulatory work to the layer. A change of control, new investors on the cap table, an MSO structure or a paid capital raise can each bring federal or state review into play. Any of these can affect timing or structure. Raise these questions with your own attorney before a term sheet sets a closing date:

Questions owners ask

What is the cheapest capital a healthcare practice can raise?

Senior secured debt usually has the lowest cash cost per dollar. That covers bank term loans, SBA loans and unitranche facilities, plus asset-based lines against receivables. It is repaid first. In return the lender takes covenants, liens and sometimes personal guarantees, not board seats. Cash flow sets the ceiling. A thin-margin services business can carry far less debt than a facility or technology company with the same revenue. Once senior capacity runs out, each added dollar costs more, whether you pay it in coupon, in warrants or in equity sold.

How much control does a minority equity investor get?

Less than a buyer, but more than most owners expect. Preferred or minority investors usually take a board seat and a liquidation preference. They also take vetoes over a sale, new debt, budgets and key hires. Stake size and voting rights can also decide whether outside regulatory review applies, so they matter as much as the name on the security.

When does a seller note make sense?

A seller note fits when the buyer cannot fund the full price with senior debt and equity, or when buyer and seller disagree on value. The note closes the gap. The seller becomes a subordinated lender to the business they just sold and ranks behind the senior lender in layer 3. The note should carry a coupon that reflects that risk, a parent guarantee where possible, a cross-default to the senior facility and acceleration on payment default.

Do state transaction laws apply to recapitalizations, not just sales?

They can. A growing number of states review deals that change control of a healthcare entity or bring in private equity, hedge fund or MSO owners, and some of those laws reach transactions well short of a full sale. Plan a recap the way you would plan a sale and build review time into the closing schedule. The site's high-risk area pages cover these categories.

Is mezzanine debt cheaper than selling preferred equity?

It depends on growth. In our worked example, a $5 million mezzanine loan at an assumed 12% coupon with 2% warrants left the owner with $63.7 million at exit when EBITDA grew from $3 million to $7 million. Non-participating preferred left $61.1 million. With flat EBITDA, non-participating preferred came out $1.0 million ahead, but only because the owner kept the cash that would have paid interest. Participating preferred trailed mezzanine in every case.

Sources